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Dissecting Between-Plant and Within-Plant Wage
Dispersion: Evidence from Germany
DANIEL BAUMGARTEN , GABRIEL FELBERMAYR and
SYBILLE LEHWALD
Using rich linked employer–employee data for (West) Germany between 1996
and 2014, we conduct a decomposition analysis based on recentered inﬂuence
function (RIF) regressions to analyze the relative contributions of various plant
and worker characteristics to the rise in German wage dispersion. Moreover, we
separately investigate the sources of between-plant and within-plant wage disper-
sion. We ﬁnd that industry effects and the collective bargaining regime contribute
the most to rising wage inequality. In the case of collective bargaining, both the
decline in collective bargaining coverage and the increase in wage dispersion
among the group of covered plants have played important roles.
Introduction
Wage inequality has been on the rise in most (industrialized) countries in
the last few decades (Acemoglu and Autor 2011). Recent research has pointed
to the growing importance of workplace heterogeneity for this development: a
large fraction of the increase in overall wage inequality is due to increased
wage dispersion between as opposed to within ﬁrms or plants. While this trend
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is shared by many countries, the speciﬁc factors explaining this increase are
still underexplored.1
Against this background, the aim of this article is to pin down the role of cen-
tral plant and worker characteristics for the increase in wage inequality, focusing
on (West) Germany. For this purpose, we use detailed linked employer–
employee data, covering the years 1996 to 2014. We adopt a particularly rich
framework and jointly evaluate the contributions of standard worker characteris-
tics (education, age, tenure, occupation, and nationality) and an extensive set of
plant characteristics (plant size, export status, collective bargaining coverage,
existence of a works council, technological status, investment intensity, industry,
and region). As the central contribution of our analysis, we separately analyze
the sources of changes in between-plant and within-plant wage dispersion, thus
shedding light on the (possibly divergent) drivers of these two important sub-
components of wage inequality and informing theoretical analyses.2 In doing so,
we also provide updated evidence on differences in the sources of upper-tail and
lower-tail (between-plant) wage dispersion. Finally, we analyze the sources of
the recent slowdown in German wage inequality (cf. M€oller 2016) and compare
the results for West Germany to the ones for East Germany.
Disentangling the role of each single variable for the rise in wage dispersion,
conditional on other variables, is politically relevant. For instance, an increase in
overall inequality due to aging of the workforce is valued differently than a simi-
lar increase driven by a higher wage gap between skill groups. However, quanti-
fying the relative contributions of various factors to rising inequality in a uniﬁed
framework, both through compositional changes and changes in the conditional
wage structure, is an empirical challenge. To this end, we apply a state-of-the-art
decomposition method based on recentered inﬂuence function (RIF) regressions
(Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux 2009). Crucially, compared to sequential decomposi-
tions, this approach has the further advantage of being path independent.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, we conﬁrm that wage dispersion
among full-time male workers in Germany has risen strongly and fairly
1 Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), Dunne et al. (2004), and more recently, Barth et al. (2016), Handw-
erker and Spletzer (2016), and Song et al. (2019) provide evidence for the United States; Faggio, Salvanes,
and Van Reenen (2010) and Mueller, Ouimet, and Simintzi (2017) for the UK; Card, Heining, and Kline
(2013) for Germany; and Helpman et al. (2017) for Brazil. In contrast, there are mixed results regarding the
importance of the between-ﬁrm component in Sweden (Akerman et al. 2013; Hakanson, Lindqvist, and Vla-
chos 2015).
2 Note that even a (hypothetically) important contribution of plant-level characteristics to overall wage
inequality does not necessarily imply that these factors are also the sources of increased between-plant wage
dispersion. Instead, they could also be associated with higher within-plant wage inequality. By the same
token, individual-level characteristics (and the returns to them) could well be responsible for increased
between-plant wage dispersion, e.g., through increased sorting.
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continuously between 1996 and 2010, but slightly declined thereafter. Both the
strong increase and the subsequent slight decrease were driven by the
between-plant as opposed to the within-plant component of wage dispersion.
Second, two employer-level characteristics contributed the most to increas-
ing wage dispersion: industry effects and the collective bargaining regime. The
former matters in terms of the wage structure effect while, in the case of col-
lective bargaining, both the composition and the wage structure play a substan-
tial role. The former reﬂects the strong decline in collective bargaining
coverage and the latter is due to both an increase in the wage gap between
covered and uncovered plants and a strong increase in wage dispersion within
the group of covered plants. According to the point estimates of the decompo-
sition results, the effects associated with the industry and the collective bar-
gaining regime together account for more than 100 percent of the total
increase in the log wage variance between 1996 and 2010, where one has to
take into account that several other factors are associated with declining wage
dispersion. Both industry effects and collective bargaining have contributed to
rising wage dispersion in very speciﬁc ways. They are sources of increasing
between-plant wage dispersion, but they are, if at all, negatively related to
within-plant wage inequality. Moreover, they have affected lower-tail as
opposed to upper-tail (between-plant) wage inequality.
Third, in terms of individual-level characteristics, education is the characteristic
that matters the most where both employment shifts toward more highly skilled
workers and, even more so, changes in the skill-related wage structure, particularly
in the wage gap between highly educated and less educated workers, have played
important roles. These factors contributed to both within-plant and between-plant
wage dispersion. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the skill-related wage structure effect, in
particular, is quantitatively even more important for between-plant than for within-
plant wage inequality, reﬂecting that a major part of changes in the skill-wage gaps
has arisen from increasing between-plant wage differentials. We attribute this ﬁnding
to increased assortative matching along the skill dimension.
Fourth, just as interesting as the factors that have contributed the most to
rising wage dispersion are the ones that have not. Plant size, exporting status,
plant technology, and investment per worker are all of little if any quantitative
importance for the increase in wage dispersion. This is remarkable given that
many potential culprits for the increase in wage inequality such as the rise of
superstar ﬁrms, globalization, and technological change could be expected to
materialize (at least partly) via these channels. It also underscores that simple,
monocausal explanations for the rise in wage dispersion do not exist and that
the impact of drivers such as international trade may be having indirect (e.g.,
by affecting institutions) rather than direct effects.
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This article builds on and contributes to a rich existing literature on wage inequal-
ity. First, our ﬁndings relate to recent research that puts special emphasis on the ﬁrm
or plant component of wage dispersion. Most notably, Card, Heining, and Kline
(2013) use (West) German linked employer–employee data and document that about
60 percent of the increase in cross-sectional wage dispersion is due to plant (ﬁxed)
effects and the covariance between plant and person effects. Their analysis rests on
the estimation approach with additive person and plant ﬁxed effects, pioneered by
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) did not
explore, however, which speciﬁc factors, i.e., plant and worker characteristics,
account for the growing importance of plant-level pay. They provide tentative evi-
dence that the decline in collective bargaining has likely contributed to this develop-
ment, yet they do not explore the quantitative importance of this channel.3 Other
research has focused on selected alternative (potential) drivers.4 Goldschmidt and
Schmieder (2017) analyzed the importance of domestic (on-site) outsourcing of
food, cleaning, security, and logistics services and found that this channel can
account for approximately 9 percent of the increase in German wage inequality since
the 1980s. Turning to international evidence, Handwerker and Spletzer (2016), hav-
ing in mind a similar hypothesis as Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017), analyzed
whether an increasing concentration of occupations at establishments has played a
role. They found that this channel can only account for a small amount of the
increase in (between-establishment) wage dispersion in the United States. Song et al.
(2019), on the other hand, provided evidence that the increase in between-ﬁrm
inequality in the United States has been driven by both increased sorting of high-
wage workers into high-wage ﬁrms and increased employee segregation in terms of
the worker-ﬁxed pay component, where higher paid and lower paid employees are
increasingly clustering in different ﬁrms. Other ﬁrm or plant characteristics that have
been found to be relevant are the industry of the workplace (Barth et al. 2016) and
the export status of the plant (Baumgarten 2013; Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier
2013; Helpman et al. 2017).5
3 Hirsch and M€uller (2018) provide further evidence in this respect. They showed that, in the cross-sec-
tion, establishment wage premia are indeed larger on average but less dispersed among plants covered by a
collective agreement than among uncovered ones. Yet they did not explicitly analyze the role of the decline
in collective bargaining for changes in (between-plant) wage dispersion over time.
4 See Card et al. (2018) for a summary of a rich literature on the determinants of ﬁrm-level pay, without,
however, focusing on drivers of changes in these premia over time.
5 The focus on the export status is motivated by recent trade theories, which analyze the link between
international trade and wage inequality in a setting with heterogeneous ﬁrms and labor-market imperfections
(e.g. Egger and Kreickemeier 2012; Felbermayr, Impullitti, and Prat 2018; Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding
2010). In these models, the exporter wage premium, the wage differential between workers employed at
exporters and the ones employed at nonexporters, is the key transmission channel from trade to wage
inequality.
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Compared to these studies, we adopt a more agnostic, but also more com-
prehensive, approach. Instead of pursuing one speciﬁc hypothesis, we account
for a whole set of explanatory factors and quantify their respective contribu-
tions to the increase in overall as well as in between-plant and within-plant
wage dispersion. Thus, our analysis can be seen as an attempt to open the
black box of those plant (and worker) effects highlighted in Card, Heining,
and Kline (2013) and the following literature. While our decomposition analy-
sis does not enable us to identify causal effects in a deeper, structural sense,
we are able to identify the proximate sources of increased wage dispersion that
any meaningful structural explanation should be consistent with.
Second, our ﬁndings relate to the more speciﬁc literature on the sources of
increasing wage dispersion in Germany. Indeed, Germany is an interesting case in
point, as it has long been known for a rather stable wage distribution, but in the
last few decades experienced a strong increase in wage inequality (which seems
to have slowed down or even slightly reversed after 2010, see M€oller 2016). In
fact, the German wage structure shares many of the developments observed in the
United States (Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Sch€onberg 2009), although there also
some notable differences. First, inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution
started to rise only in the 1990s, one decade later than in the United States (Dust-
mann, Ludsteck, and Sch€onberg 2009). Also, evidence points toward a more uni-
form increase in wage dispersion along the entire distribution in more recent years
(Biewen and Seckler 2019), whereas wages have been polarizing in the United
States (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008). Previous research has already hinted at
some important sources of rising (West) German wage inequality. In their seminal
contribution, Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Sch€onberg (2009) stress the importance of
changes in workforce composition (in line with Lemieux 2006) and the decline in
collective bargaining.6 In addition, they provide indicative evidence that techno-
logical change has played a role for the widening of the wage distribution at the
top. In line with most earlier studies, Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Sch€onberg (2009)
mostly rely on plain individual-level data, the bargaining status of the plant being
the only plant-level characteristic considered. Building upon these results, ﬁrst
Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, and Sommerfeld (2010) and, more recently, Biewen and
Seckler (2019), have conducted decomposition analyses of the increase in German
6 In subsequent research, Dustmann et al. (2014) also pointed to greater wage ﬂexibility within the cov-
ered sector, which they attributed to an increased use of “opening clauses” in industry-level collective agree-
ments.
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wage dispersion using linked employer–employee data7 and accounting for several
worker and ﬁrm characteristics. Biewen and Seckler (2019) attribute the largest
part of the observed increase in wage inequality to compositional changes in terms
of collective bargaining coverage and personal characteristics such as workers’
age and education. While both Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, and Sommerfeld (2010)
and, in particular, Biewen and Seckler (2019), are similar in spirit to our analysis,
we expand on them in several respects. First, we explicitly distinguish between-
plant and within-plant wage dispersion. Second, the LIAB data employed in our
analysis is richer in terms of plant-level variables than the alternative GSES data
used by Biewen and Seckler (2019) and allows us to account for characteristics
such as the export status, the technology status, investment intensity, and the exis-
tence of a works council.8 Finally, we also analyze the recent decline in German
wage dispersion after 2010 and compare the experiences in West and East Ger-
many to each other.9
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we
describe the linked employer–employee data used for our analysis. Then, we
brieﬂy discuss the key developments in the German wage structure. We follow
that with a section explaining the decomposition analysis. We then present a
ﬁrst descriptive overview of changes in the composition of workers and plants
as well as changes in the wage structure associated with worker and plant
characteristics, the ingredients to our decomposition analysis. In the penulti-
mate section, we provide a detailed discussion of our decomposition results,
followed by a ﬁnal concluding section.
7 Both Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, and Sommerfeld (2010) and Biewen and Seckler (2019) relied on the
German Structure of Earnings Surveys (GSES) provided by the German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, while our
analysis is based on the LIAB data provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The latter
was also used in, e.g., Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Sch€onberg (2009) and is based on the same underlying
social security records as the paper by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013). Both data sets have their pros and
cons. In contrast to the LIAB data, the GSES wage information is not top-coded at the social security contri-
bution ceiling and is a measure of hourly (rather than daily) wages. On the other hand, the LIAB is based
on administrative data, is richer in terms of plant-level variables, covers more sectors, and is available at
annual frequency (as opposed to every approximately 5 years). See Biewen and Seckler (2019) for a more
detailed discussion.
8 Biewen and Seckler (2019) used the LIAB data to impute the export behavior of ﬁrms in the GSES
data.
9 Other recent papers have analyzed additional aspects of the observed changes in the German earnings
distribution. Biewen, Fitzenberger, and de Lazzer (2018) analyzed the role of employment interruptions and
temporary part-time work for wage inequality of full-time workers. Biewen and Pl€otze (2019) studied the
role of changes in working hours for the change in monthly earnings inequality. While important, the focus
of these papers is somewhat orthogonal to our analysis, as they are not (primarily) concerned with the plant-
level dimension of wage inequality.
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Data and Sample Restrictions
We base our analysis on the German LIAB data, which is a linked
employer–employee data set provided by the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB) in Nuremberg.10 It combines the IAB Establishment
Panel with social security data on all workers who were employed in one of
the establishments as of June 30 in any given year.
The IAB Establishment Panel is a stratiﬁed sample of all establishments that
employ at least one worker subject to social security. The strata variables are
deﬁned over regions, industries, and size classes. Appropriate weights, which
are inverse to the sampling probability, are provided to ensure the representa-
tiveness of the results. The IAB Establishment Panel started in 1993 with West
German plants, while East German plants have been included from 1996
onward. Although participation in the IAB Establishment Panel is voluntary,
the response rate is very high (up to 80 percent for repeatedly interviewed
establishments). The survey is very detailed and covers many different topics.
Further plant-level variables such as the industry afﬁliation and the region
where the plant is located are provided by the Establishment History Panel.
The employee data are based on social security notiﬁcations made by the
employer on behalf of their employees, which are mandated by law. Hence,
only workers covered by social security are included in these employment
statistics, while civil servants and the self-employed are not. The data still
cover, however, about 80 percent of the German workforce. These compulsory
social security records contain personal information such as gender, year of
birth, citizenship, level of education, occupation (at a three-digit level), and
the top-coded daily wage. Speciﬁcally, wages are right-censored at the contri-
bution ceiling to the social security system. In our sample, between 9 and 14
percent of the wage observations are censored in every year. To address this
problem, we follow Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Sch€onberg (2009) and impute
the missing upper tail of the wage distribution using a series of Tobit regres-
sions.11 Using the estimated parameters from these models, we replace each
censored wage value with a random draw from the upper tail of the appropri-
ate conditional wage distribution. Wages are then converted into constant year
2000 euros by deﬂating them with the Consumer Price Index as provided by
the German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce.
10 More precisely, this study uses the Linked-Employer-Employee Data (LIAB;cross-sectional model 2
1993–2014 [LIAB QM2 9314]) from the IAB. Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research
Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the IAB and subsequently remote
data access. See Klosterhuber, Lehnert, and Seth (2016) for a detailed description of the data.
11 We run a series of Tobit regressions for each year, education group, and region (east/west). The
explanatory variables are the ones that we also use in our decomposition analysis described below.
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Similar to previous research (e.g., Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Sch€onberg
2009; Card, Heining, and Kline 2013), we limit our attention to full-time jobs
held by men in the age range 18 to 65. We exclude marginal jobs that are sub-
ject to reduced social security contributions as well as workers that undergo
training. For workers who hold multiple jobs, we only keep the highest-paying
one. We exclude observations that are reported to have an (implausibly) low
daily wage of less than ten euros. To be comparable to the earlier research
cited above, and because West and East Germany are still characterized by
substantially different labor markets and wage schedules, we focus on West
Germany for the main part of our analysis.12 Our period of analysis covers the
years from 1996 to 2014. However, for the most part, we focus on the period
1996–2010, which was characterized by a fairly steady rise in wage dispersion
(as we show in the next section). In an extension, we also look at the more
recent period from 2010 to 2014. Not only was this second (shorter) period
characterized by a decline in wage dispersion, but also by some changes to the
variables in the data set, which makes the separation of these two time periods
—in our view—a reasonable choice. Taking these restrictions into account, we
end up with 964,587 (614,483) workers and 3433 (6571) plants in 1996
(2010). It is worth noting that our sample restrictions, in particular due to the
focus on full-time workers, may lead to an underestimation of the overall level
and growth of wage inequality among German male workers. However, as the
data do not contain information on the hours worked, including part-time
workers would add too much noise to the analysis.
Trends in German Wage Inequality
Panel (a) of Figure 1 displays the evolution of overall wage inequality for our
sample as measured by the variance of log real wages. It can be seen that wage
dispersion has been rising fairly steadily (except for a dip in 2002) up to 2010
before declining slightly in the following three years and mildly rebounding in
2014. In terms of magnitude, the increase between 1996 and 2010 (2014)
amounts to about 77 percent (65 percent) of the initial value, which is substantial.
The ﬁgure also shows the development of between-plant and within-plant
wage dispersion. The variance has the attractive property that the between and
the within component add up to the total, fulﬁlling the criterion of an
12 Moreover, we do not consider those establishments in which the reporting unit in the Establishment
Panel has changed over time. This is due to the fact that such a change in the reporting unit might not be
accompanied by a corresponding change in the workforce data because the latter’s establishment ID stays
the same.
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additively separable inequality measure (Shorrocks 1980). Technically, this can
be formalized as follows:
1
Nt
X
i
wit  wtð Þ2¼ 1Nt
X
j
Njt wjt  wt
 2þ 1
Nt
X
j
X
i2j
wit  wjt
 2
;
where workers are indexed by i and plants by j. Nt and Njt denote the overall
number of workers and the number or workers in plant j at time t, respec-
tively. In addition, wit denotes the log wage of individual i, wjt the mean log
wage within plant j, and wt the overall mean log wage at time t. The overall
variance is given on the left-hand side, while the ﬁrst term on the right-hand
side denotes the between-plant variance and the second term on the right-hand
side the within-plant variance.
While in 1996 the between-plant component already accounted for 63 per-
cent of overall wage inequality, this share rose to 73 percent by 2010. Thus,
this component contributed 85 percent to the increase in wage inequality over
the main period of analysis. This is in line with ﬁndings of the related litera-
ture, which also stresses the growing importance of between-plant wage dis-
persion. Interestingly, it is also the between-plant component that accounts for
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FIGURE 1
EVOLUTION OF WAGE DISPERSION
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of the overall, between-plant, and within-plant wage
variance. We construct the measure of between-plant (within-plant) variance by running year-
speciﬁc regressions of log real individual wages on a full set of plant ﬁxed effects. We then
take the variance of predicted (residual) wages as a measure of between-plant (within-plant)
inequality. Panel (b) shows indexed log real wage growth at the 15th, 50th, and 85th
percentiles. Because at most 14 percent of wage observations are censored in each year, the
85th wage percentile is not affected. Both ﬁgures are based on LIAB data. The sample includes
full-time male workers between 18 and 65 years of age who work in West Germany.
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the decline in wage dispersion after 2010, while within-plant wage dispersion
continued to increase, albeit modestly.
While the variance is a good and frequently used summary measure of over-
all wage dispersion, it does not allow one to analyze changes at different parts
of the wage distribution. Therefore, Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows changes in
log real wages over time at different percentiles of the earnings distribution
(normalized to the year 1996). Workers at the median and at the 85th per-
centile have realized real wage gains, while workers at the 15th percentile have
faced declines in real wages. The latter were particularly pronounced in the
period 2006–2010, while they recovered slightly thereafter.13 Considering the
85–50 and 50–15 log wage differentials as measures of upper-tail and lower-
tail wage inequality, respectively, it becomes apparent that the larger part of
the overall increase in wage inequality between 1996 and 2010 was due to
changes in the lower part of the earnings distribution.
Empirical Approach and Methodology
In order to quantify the relative importance of (changes in) various covari-
ates for (changes in) the distribution of wages, our empirical approach has to
meet different requirements. First, it needs to allow us to “go beyond the
mean.” meaning that we need to decompose changes in the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of wages as opposed to changes in the average wage. Second, we
need to account for several covariates jointly in a comprehensive framework.
This is because we are interested in the conditional effects of our covariates
and on the contribution of each covariate relative to the other included factors.
Third, for each single covariate, we would like to distinguish a composition
effect that is linked to changes in the distribution of this factor, and a wage
structure effect that reﬂects changes in the conditional wage distribution over
time. The latter two requirements are usually referred to as allowing for a
detailed decomposition.
A decomposition method that can be applied beyond the mean and allows
for a detailed decomposition with respect to each single covariate in a uniﬁed
framework is the so-called RIF regression approach, which is based on RIF
regressions and was introduced by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009). A sim-
ple intuition for this methodology is that it can be regarded as a generalization
of a standard Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition technique (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca
1973) from the mean to other distributional statistics. Apart from being
13 Note that the subset of workers (and their characteristics) at each percentile might have changed over
time.
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computationally relatively simple, a key advantage of the RIF regression
approach is that the decomposition results are path independent. The latter
property implies that we do not have to take a stand on the sequential ordering
of covariates in the decomposition process, which generally matters with other
decomposition approaches.14 In the following, we sketch the key technical
details underlying our approach.15
As Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011: 76) write, “[a] RIF-regression (Firpo
et al. 2009) is similar to a standard regression, except that the dependent vari-
able, Y, is replaced by the (recentered) inﬂuence function of the statistic of
interest.” In nontechnical terms, the inﬂuence function represents the contribu-
tion of a given observation to the distributional statistic of interest, e.g., the
variance or the Gini coefﬁcient.
Assuming that the conditional expectation of RIF y; vð Þ—where y denotes
the observed wage and v FYð Þ the distributional statistic—can be modeled as a
linear function of the explanatory variables,
E RIF y; vð ÞjX½  ¼ Xcþ e;
the corresponding parameters c can be estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS). Applying this approach to quantiles, the RIF regression corresponds to
an unconditional quantile regression, which allows one to estimate the mar-
ginal effect of any explanatory variable, say, the share of workers covered by
collective bargaining, on the sth quantile of the wage distribution. Different
from a standard conditional quantile regression, which only captures within-
group (or residual) wage effects of the covariates, the unconditional quantile
regression captures both within-group and between-group effects. For example,
in the case of collective bargaining, the (typically negative) within-group effect
on wage inequality stems from the fact that within the covered sector, wages
(among comparable workers) tend to be more compressed than in the noncov-
ered sector. On the other hand, the (typically positive) between-group effects
result from covered workers usually earning a higher conditional mean wage
than noncovered workers. As this example illustrates, the within-group and the
between-group effects may go into different directions, and one or the other
may dominate at different points of the wage distribution. The RIF coefﬁcients
as such, however, do not allow us to disentangle the within-group and the
14 Alternative approaches that also allow for detailed decompositions generally do not share the property
of path independence, often face nonmonotonicity problems, and are computationally more cumbersome (see
e.g., Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly 2013; DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Melly 2005).
15 This section is very much based on Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2013) and Fortin, Lemieux, and
Firpo (2011). We refer the interested reader to these original contributions for a more extensive description
of the empirical approach.
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between-group component so that we will resort to auxiliary evidence in cases
where this distinction is of interest.
Due to the linearization, it is straightforward to apply the standard Blinder–
Oaxaca decomposition to the RIF regression. Thus, if one is interested in
decomposing changes in the distributional parameter v FYð Þ between two differ-
ent time periods (t ¼ 0 and t ¼ 1), the decomposition reads as
D^vO ¼ X1 c^v1  c^v0
 þ X1  X0
 
c^v0;
where D^vO denotes the overall change in the statistic v. The ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side denotes the wage structure effect, D^vS, which is obtained by
holding the distribution of covariates constant and only modifying the condi-
tional wage structure (represented by the RIF coefﬁcients). The second term
denotes the composition effect, D^vX , which is obtained by holding the condi-
tional wage structure (RIF coefﬁcients) constant and varying the distribution of
covariates according to the observed changes between t ¼ 0 and t ¼ 1.
As Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) explain, there may be a bias in the
decomposition because the linear speciﬁcation used in the regression is only a
local approximation that does not generally hold for larger changes in the covari-
ates. In particular, the RIF coefﬁcients might change if the distribution of the
covariates changes even though the true wage structure remains the same. To cir-
cumvent this problem, Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) propose to combine the
RIF regressions with a reweighting approach, where the counterfactual c^v01 coefﬁ-
cients are obtained from a RIF regression on the period 0 sample reweighted to
mimic the period 1 sample (such that plimðX01Þ ¼ plimðX1Þ). Taking this adjust-
ment into account, the pure wage structure effect16 amounts to
X1 c^v1  c^v01
 
and the pure composition effect17 to
X01  X0
 
c^v0:
Just as in the standard Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, it is possible to
obtain the detailed elements of the wage structure and the composition effects
attributable to different subsets of the vector of explanatory variables, X. How-
ever, in the case of the wage structure effect, the detailed elements are not
16 The “naive” wage structure effect can be divided into the pure wage structure effect and the reweight-
ing error. See Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) for details.
17 The “naive” composition effect can be divided into a pure composition effect and a component mea-
suring the speciﬁcation error. The speciﬁcation error captures the difference between the composition effect
estimated using a nonparametric reweighting approach and the linear approximation obtained using the RIF
regression.
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unique and, for categorical variables, depend on the choice of the base cate-
gory, which has to be taken into account when interpreting the results.
It is important to stress that the decomposition method, similar to alternative
decomposition approaches used in the literature (e.g., DiNardo, Fortin, and
Lemieux 1996; Fairlie 2005; Mata and Machado 2005), relies on the assump-
tion of the invariance of the conditional distribution and therefore ignores gen-
eral equilibrium effects. For our analysis this implies, e.g., that the collective
bargaining wage premium is assumed to be independent of collective bargain-
ing coverage. Moreover, the decomposition takes all covariates as exogenously
given and not themselves determined by other factors that might also lead to
higher wage inequality. This, however, implies that a causal interpretation of
the estimated effects is not possible.
We use this approach to quantify the contributions of an extensive set of
explanatory factors to changes in the wage distribution. These factors include
the personal characteristics education (four categories);18 age (ﬁve cate-
gories);19 tenure (six categories);20 nationality (German versus non-German);
and dummies for three types of occupations, which are characterized by pre-
dominantly manual, routine, and abstract tasks, respectively (similar to Ace-
moglu and Autor 2011). Moreover, we consider a large set of plant
characteristics: size as measured by total employment (ten categories);21 the
export status (three categories);22 a dummy variable that indicates whether the
plant has a works council; two dummy variables capturing the bargaining
regime of the plant (sector-level and ﬁrm-level agreement, respectively, where
no collective bargaining agreement is the base category); two dummy variables
that equal one if the plant has invested in information and communications
technology (ICT) and if the (self-assessed) technology status of the plant is
above average compared to other plants in the same industry, respectively; and
categorical information on investment per worker (six categories).23 We also
include full sets of two-digit industry and federal state dummies to capture
18 (1) Low: no vocational training, no high school; (2) Medium: high school and/or vocational training;
(3) High: university or technical college. The fourth category consists of observations with missing educa-
tional information.
19 (1) 18–25 years; (2) 26–35 years; (3) 36–45 years; (4) 46–55 years; (5) 56–65 years.
20 (1) 0–2 years; (2) 2–4 years; (3) 4–8 years; (4) 8–16 years; (5) >16 years; (6) missing tenure. Exclud-
ing the missing category, these roughly constitute quintiles of the West German tenure distribution in 1996.
21 (1) 1–4 employees; (2) 5–9 employees; (3) 10–19 employees; (4) 20–49 employees; (5) 50–99
employees; (6) 100–199 employees; (7) 200–499 employees; (8) 500–999 employees; (9) 1000–4999
employees; (10) ≥5000 employees.
22 (1) Nonexporters; (2) exporters; (3) establishments with missing export information, which comprises
a fairly large number of establishments in the service sector.
23 Five categories refer to the quintiles of this variable as measured in the base year 1996, while the
sixth category comprises establishments with missing information on investments.
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sectoral and regional shifts during our period under study.24 Finally, in this
framework the constant captures that portion of (the change in) wage disper-
sion that cannot be explained by observables and thus can be interpreted as
(change in) residual inequality of the base group.
We apply the decomposition method to changes in overall wage distribution
as well as to changes in between-plant and within-plant wage dispersion. As
explained above, for the most part, we conduct the decomposition analysis for
the period 1996–2010, but turn to the more recent period from 2010 to 2014
in an extension. Likewise, while the main analysis focuses on West Germany,
we conduct the decomposition analysis for East Germany in a further exten-
sion. For statistical inference, we rely on a bootstrap (200 replications) of the
whole decomposition. To account for the correlation of wages within plants, a
block bootstrap procedure is applied in which all observations within a given
plant are resampled. Finally, throughout the analysis, we use appropriate sam-
pling weights to ensure the representativeness of the results.
Preliminary Evidence on Changes in the Workforce Composition and
the Wage Structure
Before discussing the detailed decomposition results of changes in wage dis-
persion, we provide descriptive evidence on changes in the composition of
workers and plants as well as changes in the wage structure related to worker
and plant characteristics. These constitute the ingredients, albeit in an uncondi-
tional and simpliﬁed way, to our decomposition analysis where we quantify
their respective contributions to the increase in wage inequality.
Changes in the composition of workers and plants. The ﬁrst two columns
of Table 1 illustrate the composition of workers according to various individ-
ual and plant characteristics for the years 1996 and 2010.
In terms of sociodemographic characteristics, there is a visible trend toward
more highly skilled and, even more so, older workers and those with longer
tenure. The share of workers with university education in our sample increased
24 We choose our base category to be a medium-skilled worker, in the age range of 26–35, with 0–
2 years of tenure at his current employer, with German nationality, employed in an occupation characterized
by mainly routine tasks, employed at an establishment with 200–499 employees, which does not export, has
no works council, is not covered by a collective bargaining agreement of any sort, has not invested in infor-
mation and communication technology, does not have a high technology status, is in the bottom quintile of
investment per worker, belongs to the construction sector, and is located in North Rhine-Westphalia. With
very few exceptions (i.e., collective bargaining, works council, investment in ICT), where the “no” category
seems to be the natural benchmark, these constitute the modal categories of the variables in 1996.
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from 8 percent in 1996 to 12 percent in 2010.25 In addition, the share of work-
ers in the age group 46–55 (56–65) increased from 21 percent (10 percent) to
31 percent (13 percent), and the fraction of workers with more than 8 years of
tenure rose from 38 to 48 percent. In contrast, there are small declines in the
shares of routine workers and foreign workers, respectively. It has to be noted,
however, that in the present data, workers are classiﬁed as foreigners/natives
based on their nationality. Because the German nationality law was reformed
during our sample period, making it easier to obtain German citizenship, this
decline most likely reﬂects changes in citizenship rather than a decline in the
number of migrant workers.
In terms of plant characteristics, the most drastic change relates to collective
bargaining coverage. Table 1 shows that the share of workers covered by a sec-
tor-level bargaining agreement declined by 18 percentage points (from 75 percent
to 57 percent), which was compounded by a small decrease in the share of work-
ers covered by ﬁrm-level bargaining agreements (from 11 percent to 9 percent).26
Note that, because we are considering an unbalanced panel of plants, this decline
comes about by both previously covered plants leaving collective bargaining and
entering (young) plants being less likely to follow a collective agreement than
exiting (old) ones. As a further change to the structure of industrial relations, the
share of workers in plants with a works council also declined.
In addition, there has been a shift toward plants with less investment per
worker. Finally, regarding the importance of international trade, no clear pat-
tern emerges as both the share of workers at exporters and nonexporters
increased in our sample, at the expense of plants with missing information on
exports. Most likely, however, the group with missing information (which
mostly are in the service sector) will predominantly consist of nonexporters.
Changes in the wage structure relating to worker and plant characteris-
tics. The second part of Table 1 (columns 3–14) displays the structure and
development of between-group mean wages and intra-group wage dispersion
(as measured by the standard deviation), respectively, where these groups are
25 In addition, the share of workers with missing education information also increased. According to
their (unconditional) mean wages, this group seems to resemble most closely the group of low-skilled work-
ers (which decreased by an amount similar to the increase of the missing data), suggesting that particularly
the share of medium-skilled workers declined.
26 In Germany, the recognition of trade unions regarding collective bargaining purposes is at the discre-
tion of the ﬁrm. Once a ﬁrm has recognized a union, collective bargaining outcomes typically apply de facto
to all workers in that ﬁrm, regardless of whether they are union members or not (for a discussion see e.g.,
Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Sch€omberg 2009 and Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke 2013). Such collective
agreements are either formed at the ﬁrm or at the sector level. Firms that once have recognized a collective
agreement, however, can later decide to opt out at their own discretion.
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again formed according to the same worker and plant characteristics. We pre-
sent group-mean wages and intra-group wage dispersion for overall wages
(columns 3–6) as well as separately for the between-plant (columns 7–10) and
within-plant (columns 11–14) wage components. These subcomponents have
been obtained as predicted values and residuals, respectively, of year-speciﬁc
regressions of log real wages on a full set of plant ﬁxed effects.
Intra-group wage dispersion. We ﬁrst focus on the structure and develop-
ment of intra-group wage dispersion, i.e., on the columns displaying the group-
speciﬁc standard deviations of wages, and start with overall wages (columns 4
and 6). In this respect, the table portrays two main ﬁndings. First, intra-group
wage dispersion differs markedly across groups. For example, regarding individual
characteristics, it slightly increases in the workers’ age, and it is larger for foreign-
ers than for natives. Surprisingly, it seems to decline rather quickly with higher
education and with longer tenure. With respect to plant characteristics, it is, not
surprisingly, substantially larger among plants not covered by collective bargaining
agreements and among plants without a works council. It is also larger among
smaller plants and nonexporters than among their respective counterparts.
Thus, several of the important compositional changes outlined in the previ-
ous subsection, in particular those regarding age, collective bargaining cover-
age, and the existence of a works council, entail a relative shift toward groups
with larger within-group wage dispersion, suggesting that composition effects
should play a role for the increase in wage inequality.
Second, in all groups, with no single exception, intra-group wage dispersion
increased markedly over the period of analysis. Thus, in addition to composi-
tion effects, wage structure effects have also played a role. The magnitude of
this increase again differs across groups, sometimes reinforcing initial differ-
ences in intra-group wage dispersion (e.g., in the case of plant size where it
increased more among small than among large plants) and sometimes dampen-
ing them (e.g., in the case of collective bargaining for which intra-group wage
dispersion increased more among covered than among uncovered plants).
Focusing on the structure and development of between-plant (columns 8
and 10) and within-plant (columns 12 and 14) wage dispersion, the between-
plant component is larger than the within-plant component for most sub-
groups.27 However, there are some differences. For example, among workers
27 Note, however, that between-plant and within-plant wage dispersion, as measured by the variance, do
not have to add up to the total for every single subgroup as they are still based on the plant-mean wages
and within-plant wage residuals that we calculated for the entire sample. The covariance between these two
terms will be zero if subgroups are formed according to plant-level characteristics—in which the mean
within-group wage residual is always zero by construction—but will generally not be equal to zero if sub-
groups are formed according to individual characteristics.
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employed at larger plants, the within component is more important. The same
goes for workers employed at plants with a works council. In addition, the
between-plant component has grown more strongly over time for most sub-
groups.
Mean wage gaps between groups. The overall wage structure is not only
shaped by wage dispersion within groups but also by (mean) wage gaps
between groups. Note that these mean differences matter for both the composi-
tion effect and the wage structure effect of the decomposition analysis. To the
extent that between-group wage differentials change, they will contribute to
the wage structure effect. On the other hand, to the extent that there are com-
positional shifts toward groups whose (initial) group-mean wages are relatively
far from (close to) the grand mean, these will contribute to greater (lower)
wage inequality via the composition effect.
Hence, Table 1 also shows mean wages by subgroups (e.g., columns 3 and
5 with respect to overall wages). At the individual level, we can observe a
strong increase in the wage gap between the highly educated and those with
lower levels of education and in the “returns” to an occupation characterized
by abstract tasks relative to routine and manual tasks. There is also a growing
wage penalty for younger age groups and for workers with shorter tenure. In
addition, wage differences increased along a number of plant characteristics,
such as plant size, exporting, the existence of a works council, and investment
in ICT.
Again, we also show separately the structure and development of between-
plant and within-plant mean wages (columns 7 and 9 as well as 11 and 13,
respectively).28 Interestingly, we see that, in the education, occupation, and
tenure dimensions, most of the increase in the between-group wage gaps are
due to the between-plant component. This ﬁnding provides tentative evidence
that sorting in these dimensions has become more important over time.
Decomposition Results
We now turn to our detailed decomposition results based on RIF regres-
sions. Our main speciﬁcation generally refers to West Germany and focuses
on the change in wage inequality between 1996 and 2010. We ﬁrst discuss
our ﬁndings regarding overall wage inequality. We then turn to our separate
28 Due to the aforementioned reason that mean within-plant wage residuals are zero by construction at
the plant level, this distinction is only interesting for groupings deﬁned according to individual-level as
opposed to plant-level characteristics.
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decomposition results for between-plant and within-plant wage dispersion and,
in further extensions, explore differences between lower-tail and upper-tail
wage dispersion, changes over time, and differences between West and East
Germany.
TABLE 2
DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGES IN THE OVERALL VARIANCE, 1996–2010
Total Change
8.68***
[0.47]
Composition Wage Structure
Nationality 0.05** 0.09
[0.02] [0.15]
Education 0.73*** 1.92***
[0.20] [0.34]
Age 0.29*** 2.23***
[0.08] [0.67]
Tenure 0.10 3.36***
[0.08] [1.09]
Occupation 0.17*** 0.61**
[0.06] [0.29]
Region 0.04 1.20
[0.07] [0.90]
Industry 0.14 4.04***
[0.27] [1.55]
Plant size 0.07 1.91**
[0.10] [0.94]
Collective bargaining 1.22*** 3.51***
[0.33] [0.84]
Works council 0.03 3.31***
[0.07] [0.74]
Export 0.01 0.74
[0.07] [0.59]
Technology 0.03 0.82
[0.03] [0.70]
Investment per worker 0.01 1.98
[0.11] [1.26]
Constant 4.82
[3.78]
Total 2.49*** 6.31***
[0.46] [0.52]
Reweighting error 0.15
[0.21]
Speciﬁcation error 0.03
[0.22]
Notes: The decomposition is based on LIAB data. The sample includes full-time male workers between 18 and 65 years of
age who work in West Germany. Sampling weights are employed. All numbers are given in log percentage points. Boot-
strapped standard errors (200 replications of the entire procedure) account for clustering at the plant level and are shown
in brackets. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.
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Baseline decomposition of the change in overall wage inequality. The
results of our baseline decomposition of changes in the log wage variance
between 1996 and 2010 are presented in Table 2, where the values represent
log percentage points and generally give the joint contribution of groups of
(dummy) variables belonging to the explanatory factors listed in the left col-
umn of the table. In addition to composition and wage structure effects, we
also report the speciﬁcation and reweighting errors.
Looking ﬁrst at the total composition and wage structure effects, respec-
tively, reveals that the former contribute about 29 percent and the latter about
73 percent to the increase in wage dispersion over the sample period (where
the difference to 100 percent is accounted for by the negative reweighting
error). Among the composition effects, the ones associated with collective bar-
gaining coverage contribute the most to the increase in wage dispersion. This
reﬂects the strong decline in (particularly sector-level) collective bargaining
coverage rates discussed in the previous section. As shown in the same sec-
tion, this decline supposes a relative shift toward the group of (uncovered)
workers characterized by both higher intra-group wage dispersion and group-
mean wages that are relatively far from the grand mean. The contribution of
the bargaining-related composition effect amounts to 1.22 log percentage
points, which corresponds to 14.1 percent of the total increase and about half
of the total composition effect, respectively. Among the remaining composition
effects, only shifts in the education proﬁle of workers have played a small, but
non-negligible role, contributing 0.7 log percentage points to the rise in wage
inequality. They capture the relative shifts toward higher-educated workers,
i.e., a group characterized by group-mean wages that are relatively far from
the grand mean.
Turning to the wage structure effects, the ones associated with industry ﬁxed
effects and, once more, collective bargaining, are the quantitatively most
important ones (4.04 and 3.51 log percentage points, respectively). Recall that
the wage structure effects capture both a between component, that is, changes
in wage differentials between groups (e.g., industries, different bargaining
regimes), and a within component, that is, changes in wage dispersion within
groups (compared to the base group). In the case of collective bargaining, both
of these components are at work and contribute to greater wage dispersion. On
the one hand, the wage gap between covered and uncovered workers increased
slightly, and on the other hand, wage dispersion within the group of workers
covered by (sector-level) agreements rose much more strongly than among
uncovered ones, our base group (see the previous section). The latter develop-
ment has also been highlighted by Dustmann et al. (2014) and is related to an
increasing ﬂexibility within collective agreements. A similar story applies to
the industry-related wage structure effect, which captures both increasing
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industry mean wage differentials and a growing wage dispersion within indus-
tries. While the RIF-based decomposition result does not allow us to disentan-
gle the two, the latter channel seems to be the more important one. That is, if
we do the same simple decomposition of the log wage variance into a between
and a within component as in the Trends in German Wage Inequality section,
but this time focus on industries rather than plants, it turns out that approxi-
mately 70 percent of the increase in wage inequality over our period of analy-
sis took place within, as opposed to between, industries.
Among the remaining wage structure effects, the ones relating to education
and age contribute positively to rising wage dispersion, while the ones associ-
ated with tenure, the existence of a works council, plant size, and investment
per worker dampen it, although the latter is not statistically signiﬁcant. The
other wage structure effects are not important determinants of greater wage
dispersion.29
Comparing our baseline decomposition results to the related paper by Bie-
wen and Seckler (2019), we see both similarities and differences. Based on
their analysis of the alternative GSES data, they also attributed the largest
composition effect to the decline of union coverage. However, they found this
decline to be quantitatively much more important. Biewen and Seckler (2019)
put this down to the fact that the GSES data have information on collective
bargaining coverage at the worker level as opposed to the plant (or ﬁrm) level,
which is the information provided in the LIAB data. This explanation would
also be consistent with the difference in the bargaining-related wage structure
effect, which is very important in our analysis, yet negligible in Biewen and
Seckler (2019).30 Again, one explanation might be that what we view as
greater wage dispersion among workers at covered plants (wage structure) is
driven by a declining share of workers at those plants that are actually subject
to collective agreements (composition). However, one challenge to this inter-
pretation is that we would expect these differences to matter (at least partly)
for within-plant wage inequality, while we ﬁnd both the bargaining-related
composition and the wage structure effects to be relevant almost exclusively
29 This includes the wage structure effect related to exporting. The latter result stands in contrast to the
one obtained by Baumgarten (2013) who, however, focused on the manufacturing sector only and consid-
ered a slightly different sampling period—the analysis of Baumgarten (2013) ends in 2007, that is, before
the exporter wage premium decreased during the Great Recession (see Dauth, Schmerer, and Winkler 2015).
Moreover, we include a larger set of plant-level control variables and apply a slightly different decomposi-
tion technique.
30 Both our results of an important, but more moderate composition effect of collective bargaining and a
substantial role played by a greater wage dispersion among covered plants are in line with the ﬁndings of
Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Sch€onberg (2009) and Dustmann et al. (2014), yet arrived at in a multivariate set-
ting. This is not surprising, as we rely on the same data source.
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for between-plant wage inequality (see below). Additional reasons for the
quantitative discrepancy likely are that (1) we control for more employer-level
variables, and (2) the sample composition is different, as the GSES data does
not include ﬁrms with fewer than ten employees subject to social security con-
tributions and does not cover all the sectors of the economy. The latter factor
most likely also explains why we ﬁnd an industry-related wage structure effect
that is much larger than in Biewen and Seckler (2019).
Decomposition of changes in between-plant and within-plant wage inequal-
ity. We now separately decompose changes in between-plant and within-plant
wage dispersion. For this purpose, we apply the same decomposition technique
to changes in the variance of predicted wages and wage residuals, respectively,
of a regression of log individual wages on a full set of plant ﬁxed effects. At
ﬁrst sight, a natural expectation could be that plant characteristics, with their
composition and wage structure effects, should be the main drivers of
between-plant wage dispersion while individual characteristics should be the
main drivers of within-plant wage dispersion. However, that does not need to
be the case. To the extent that individual characteristics also matter for
between-plant wage inequality, this suggests that workers with different char-
acteristics are unevenly distributed across plants, providing (indirect) evidence
for assortative matching. Indeed, previous research has already shown the
growing importance of assortative matching, as measured by the correlation
between individual and plant effects, for wage inequality (Card, Heining, and
Kline 2013). On the other hand, to the extent that plant characteristics matter
for within-plant wage dispersion, this suggests that these characteristics affect
individual workers’ wages unevenly.
We ﬁrst turn to the detailed decomposition results of between-plant wage
inequality, shown in the left part of Table 3. As the increase in the between-
plant variance accounts for the largest part of the increase in the overall vari-
ance, it is not surprising that the main factors contributing to the rise are iden-
tical. Again, most of the increase (roughly 80 percent) is due to wage structure
effects. Among the composition effects (column 1), the largest contribution to
the increase in between-plant wage inequality again comes from changes in
collective bargaining coverage rates. The bargaining-related composition effect
amounts to 1.29 log percentage points (corresponding to 18 percent of the
total increase in between-plant wage inequality or 74 percent of the total com-
position effect) and is, thus, even slightly larger than in the case of overall
inequality, both in relative and absolute terms. Thus, the decline in collective
bargaining, driven primarily by a strongly decreasing share of plants covered
by sector-level agreements, has come with a greater dispersion of wages across
plants. Among the composition effects related to individual characteristics,
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TABLE 3
DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGES IN BETWEEN-PLANT AND WITHIN-PLANT VARIANCE, 1996–2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Between-Plant Variance Within-Plant Variance
Total change 7.26*** 1.41***
[0.46] [0.13]
Composition Wage Structure Composition Wage Structure
Nationality 0.05*** 0.06 0.01 0.02
[0.02] [0.13] [0.00] [0.03]
Education 0.36** 1.50*** 0.11*** 0.01
[0.14] [0.28] [0.04] [0.10]
Age 0.07 1.18** 0.10*** 0.25
[0.06] [0.56] [0.02] [0.19]
Tenure 0.06 3.07*** 0.13* 0.45
[0.04] [0.90] [0.07] [0.29]
Occupation 0.01 0.28 0.10*** 0.34***
[0.03] [0.25] [0.04] [0.09]
Region 0.04 1.72** 0.00 0.61**
[0.07] [0.85] [0.02] [0.29]
Industry 0.40 5.81*** 0.10 1.32***
[0.26] [1.39] [0.07] [0.36]
Plant size 0.13 0.61 0.04 0.81**
[0.13] [0.93] [0.04] [0.37]
Collective bargaining 1.29*** 3.50*** 0.01 0.44
[0.31] [0.83] [0.07] [0.29]
Works council 0.06 2.78*** 0.04 0.11
[0.06] [0.76] [0.03] [0.30]
Export 0.04 0.56 0.02 0.07
[0.07] [0.57] [0.02] [0.22]
Technology 0.02 0.47 0.00 0.15
[0.03] [0.68] [0.01] [0.20]
Investment per worker 0.02 2.50** 0.04 0.35
[0.11] [1.18] [0.03] [0.35]
Constant 2.35 3.65***
[3.40] [0.97]
Total 1.74*** 5.85*** 0.48*** 0.78***
[0.42] [0.50] [0.14] [0.16]
Reweighting error 0.18 0.05
[0.18] [0.07]
Speciﬁcation error 0.15 0.11
[0.21] [0.09]
Notes: The between-plant (within-plant) variance is constructed as the variance of predicted (residual) wages of a regression
of log individual wages on a full set of plant ﬁxed effects. The decomposition is based on LIAB data. The sample
includes full-time male workers between 18 and 65 years of age who work in West Germany. Sampling weights are
employed. All numbers are given in log percentage points. Bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications of the entire
procedure) account for clustering at the plant level and are shown in brackets. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.
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(only) the explanatory factor education contributes non-negligibly to the rise in
between-plant wage dispersion. The latter’s contribution amounts to 0.36 log
percentage points, corresponding to 5 percent of the total increase in between-
plant wage inequality or, equivalently, to 20 percent of the total composition
effect.
Turning to the wage structure effects (column 2), consistent with our earlier
ﬁndings, the ones associated with industry ﬁxed effects and the collective bar-
gaining regime contribute quantitatively the most to increasing between-plant
wage inequality. In contrast, the wage structure effects associated with tenure,
the existence of a works council, and the level of investment per worker are
negative. This reﬂects that, for these categorical variables, between-plant wage
dispersion within a given group has declined relative to the base group (work-
ers with less than 2 years of tenure, plants without a works council, and plants
in the bottom quintile of investment per worker, respectively). Among the
wage structure effects associated with the remaining worker-level variables, it
is again the one relating to education that stands out in contributing the most
to greater between-plant wage inequality. The education-related wage structure
effect mainly captures that plant-level wage differentials between education
groups have increased. That is, the gap between the mean plant wage of a
high-skilled and a low-skilled worker and between a high-skilled and one with
missing information on education has increased substantially over time (by 17
and 21 log percentage points, respectively). This is consistent with the notion
of increased assortative matching along the skill dimension, where high-skilled
workers are more and more concentrated at high-wage paying plants and low-
skilled workers at low-wage paying plants. This result is in line with Card,
Heining, and Kline (2013), who also ﬁnd that the degree of sorting of different
education and occupation groups to different establishments has risen in West
Germany.31
We now turn to the results on within-plant wage inequality (columns 3 and
4). The most striking ﬁnding is that by far the largest contribution to the
increase in this subcomponent of wage inequality comes from the wage struc-
ture effect associated with the constant, which captures the increase in residual
inequality of the base group. In fact, the latter is more than twice as large as
the total observed increase in within-plant inequality, implying that all remain-
ing factors have, in sum, had a negative, i.e., inequality-dampening
contribution.
If we look at those factors separately, only a few are statistically signiﬁcant
and/or noteworthy in terms of their magnitude. One of them is occupation,
31 We assume that workers with missing educational information are most likely low-skilled workers.
According to their unconditional mean wages, this is a plausible assumption; see Table 1.
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which contributes positively and signiﬁcantly to increased within-plant wage
inequality both in terms of the composition and the wage structure effect.
Recall that we have grouped occupations in terms of their task characteristics,
distinguishing predominantly manual, routine (the base group), and abstract
occupations. The composition effect reﬂects the relative decrease in the share
of routine occupations characterized by lower within-plant wage dispersion
and mean (plant-residualized) wages closer to the grand mean. The occupa-
tion-related wage structure effect, in turn, arises mainly from greater increases
in within-plant wage dispersion among manual and, in particular, abstract
occupations relative to routine ones. Among the remaining individual-level
characteristics, compositional shifts toward larger shares of high-educated and
older workers as well as those with longer tenure have also led to higher
within-plant wage inequality.
Interestingly, the industry-related wage structure effect, the single most
important factor for increased between-plant wage dispersion, contributes nega-
tively to within-plant wage dispersion. Because there are no differences across
industries in terms of their mean within-plant wages—they are zero by con-
struction—this is due to a relatively smaller increase in within-plant wage dis-
persion among industries other than the base industry, i.e., construction. In
addition, collective bargaining, which was another main factor for increased
between-plant wage dispersion, does not matter at all for changes in within-
plant wage dispersion.
In summary, this analysis shows that the main sources of between-plant and
within-plant wage dispersion differ and some explanatory factors even are
related to both subcomponents of wage inequality in opposing ways. The most
important explanatory factors for the large increase in between-plant wage
inequality are the wage structure effects associated with the industry and the
collective bargaining regime as well as the compositional shift implied by the
strong decline in collective bargaining coverage. The worker-level characteris-
tic education is the only one for which both the composition and wage struc-
ture effects are positively related to both subcomponents of wage dispersion.
Interestingly, the wage structure effect associated with education is quantita-
tively more important for between-plant than for within-plant wage inequality.
This mirrors the ﬁnding that most of the increase in the skill wage gap arises
from an increase in between-plant rather than within-plant wage differentials.
Top versus bottom. Although the log wage variance has the advantage that
the between-plant and the within-plant components add up to the total, it does
not allow us to distinguish sources of wage dispersion at the top and the bot-
tom of the wage distribution. Therefore, we also do our decomposition
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analysis for the 50–15 log wage differential (as a measure of lower-tail wage
inequality) and the 85–50 log wage differential (as a measure of upper-tail
wage inequality) of both mean plant wages and within-plant wage residuals,
respectively.32 Results are shown in Table 4.
As far as between-plant wage inequality is concerned (columns 1 and 2),
more than two thirds of the increase in wage dispersion over the period of
analysis (18.5 of 26.8 log percentage points) occurred at the lower part of the
wage distribution. This difference between lower-tail and upper-tail inequality
is due to wage structure effects, while composition effects are, in sum, small
and of about equal magnitude. The main contributing factors to the increase in
lower-tail, between-plant wage dispersion are the wage structure effects related
to industry ﬁxed effects and the collective bargaining regime, which amount to
16.6 and 10.9 log percentage points, respectively (column 1, bottom panel). In
contrast, both of these factors do not matter for the change in upper-tail,
between-plant wage dispersion, in which the wage structure effects associated
with the region and the constant are quantitatively the most important ones
(although the latter is not statistically signiﬁcant; cf. column 2, bottom panel).
The composition effect associated with collective bargaining is again only
relevant for lower-tail wage inequality. Thus, the decline in collective bargain-
ing has been associated with a widening of the lower part of the plant wage
distribution, where union wages are more likely to bind than in the upper part
of the distribution.
The picture looks different for within-plant wage inequality (columns 3 and 4),
where about 60 percent of the (small) increase in total wage dispersion over the
sample period took place in the upper half of the wage distribution (1.96 of
3.31 log percentage points). By far, the main source of this increase in upper-tail,
within-plant wage dispersion is not related to any particular factor but to the wage
structure effect of the constant, which captures an increase in residual inequality
of the base group (column 4). The contribution of the constant amounts to 15 log
percentage points, which is more than seven (!) times larger than the total change
in this inequality measure. Further contributions, which are statistically signiﬁcant
and positive but small, come from the explanatory factors education, occupation
—both through the composition and the wage structure effects—and age, where
only the composition effect is relevant. In contrast, wage structure effects associ-
ated with the region, the industry, and plant size are all highly negative, i.e.,
inequality-dampening, and statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, regarding the change in lower-tail, within-plant wage dispersion,
hardly any results stand out, the main exceptions being the wage structure
32 Note that, now, the between-plant and the within-plant component of any inequality measure do not
anymore (necessarily) add up to the total.
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TABLE 4
DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGES IN BETWEEN-PLANT AND WITHIN-PLANT QUANTILE DIFFERENCES, 1996–
2010
Inequality measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Between-Plant Within-Plant
50–15 85–50 50–15 85–50
Total change 18.45*** 8.35*** 1.36*** 1.96***
[1.50] [1.35] [0.33] [0.58]
Composition
Nationality 0.06* 0.02 0.02 0.01
[0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Education 0.39* 0.83*** 0.25** 0.33**
[0.22] [0.26] [0.10] [0.16]
Age 0.10 0.27*** 0.01 0.78***
[0.12] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10]
Tenure 0.09 0.14 0.18*** 0.03
[0.11] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06]
Occupation 0.02 0.08 0.15** 0.52***
[0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.20]
Region 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.00
[0.22] [0.21] [0.06] [0.08]
Industry 1.03* 1.32* 0.08 1.38***
[0.59] [0.73] [0.20] [0.42]
Plant size 0.45 0.23 0.03 0.23
[0.28] [0.32] [0.06] [0.20]
Collective bargaining 1.29** 0.03 0.28 0.36
[0.59] [0.46] [0.18] [0.31]
Works council 0.26 0.08 0.04 0.04
[0.26] [0.21] [0.06] [0.12]
Export 0.01 0.35 0.07 0.07
[0.19] [0.29] [0.06] [0.11]
Technology 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01
[0.09] [0.09] [0.02] [0.05]
Investment per worker 0.17 0.05 0.17* 0.09
[0.32] [0.27] [0.09] [0.13]
Total 2.19** 2.68** 0.80*** 0.32
[0.93] [1.08] [0.30] [0.55]
Wage structure
Nationality 0.20 0.01 0.06 0.03
[0.27] [0.09] [0.10] [0.09]
Education 4.52*** 0.23 0.79** 0.94**
[0.95] [0.66] [0.36] [0.44]
Age 0.01 0.02 0.75 0.37
[1.15] [0.86] [0.68] [0.88]
Tenure 11.73*** 1.47 0.56 0.35
[3.92] [1.38] [0.77] [0.89]
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effects related to plant size and investment per worker, which are statistically
signiﬁcant and amount to 2.1 and 2.3 log percentage points, respectively (col-
umn 3). Thus, increases in wage dispersion within plants in a given plant size
and investment per worker category (relative to the respective base groups,
i.e., plants with 200–499 workers and in the bottom quintile of investment
intensity) were important factors behind the (modest) increase in lower-tail,
within-plant wage inequality.
The recent decline in wage inequality. So far, we have analyzed the contri-
butions of the different factors to the change in wage dispersion over the
period 1996–2010, which was characterized by a pronounced and fairly steady
TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)
Inequality measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Between-Plant Within-Plant
50–15 85–50 50–15 85–50
Occupation 1.02 0.31 0.62** 1.02*
[0.73] [0.50] [0.24] [0.53]
Region 3.18 4.70* 1.26* 2.79**
[3.19] [2.49] [0.65] [1.12]
Industry 16.62** 2.34 1.21 4.82***
[6.59] [3.79] [1.09] [1.48]
Plant size 5.42 2.41 2.08*** 4.77**
[4.53] [4.26] [0.79] [2.09]
Collective bargaining 10.94** 1.92 0.02 2.05
[4.37] [2.50] [0.68] [1.30]
Works council 8.99** 2.42 1.07* 1.39
[3.76] [2.60] [0.56] [1.43]
Export 0.56 2.88 0.28 0.37
[2.36] [2.11] [0.50] [1.09]
Technology 5.40* 0.69 0.22 0.24
[2.77] [1.75] [0.53] [0.72]
Investment per worker 2.63 0.05 2.25*** 0.18
[4.40] [2.33] [0.76] [1.16]
Constant 16.11 4.81 1.30 15.02***
[11.02] [10.57] [2.39] [4.88]
Total 15.81*** 5.68*** 1.17*** 0.35
[2.02] [1.43] [0.43] [0.84]
Reweighting error 0.36 0.35 0.10 0.26
[0.36] [0.40] [0.13] [0.24]
Speciﬁcation error 0.81 0.34 0.72*** 1.02*
[1.11] [1.08] [0.24] [0.57]
Notes: The between-plant (within-plant) quantile differences are constructed as percentile differences (50–15 and 85–50,
respectively) of predicted (residual) wages of a regression of log individual wages on a full set of plant ﬁxed effects. The
decomposition is based on LIAB data. The sample includes full-time male workers between 18 and 65 years of age who
work in West Germany. Sampling weights are employed. All numbers are given in log percentage points. Bootstrapped
standard errors (200 replications of the entire procedure) account for clustering at the plant level and are shown in brack-
ets. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.
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increase in wage inequality. Thereafter, however, rising wage dispersion seems
to have come to a halt. In this subsection, we conduct the same decomposition
analysis for the change in wage inequality between 2010 and 2014 to obtain a
better understanding of the change in the inequality dynamics. We again do so
separately for changes in overall, between-plant, and within-plant wage disper-
sion. Results are displayed in Table 5.
In the following, we highlight a few noteworthy ﬁndings. First of all, the
decline in the log wage variance has been very modest (0.47 log percentage
points) and has been entirely due to the between-plant component, while within-
plant wage dispersion continued to rise slightly. Interestingly, for all of our wage
dispersion measures, the total composition effects are positive (i.e., inequality-in-
creasing) while the total wage structure effects are inequality-dampening. This
result, however, has to be interpreted with some caution. Due to a change in the
compulsory notiﬁcations of employers to the social security agencies imple-
mented for employment spells ending after November 30, 2011, the set of avail-
able variables and their exact deﬁnitions in the administrative records used in our
analysis changed during the most recent time interval.33 As a consequence, the
share of missing data, in particular regarding the education variable, increased
sharply (from 14 to 28 percent, mostly at the expense of low-skilled and med-
ium-skilled workers). This implies a seeming change in the composition of the
workforce, which is entirely data-driven, but clearly affects the decomposition
results. Indeed, the spurious education-related composition effect is positive, sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, and quantitatively the most important one for all the mea-
sures of wage dispersion (columns 1, 3, and 5). Likewise, the education-related
wage structure effect, which is negative and substantial for the change in the
overall and the between-plant variance (columns 2 and 4), is rather misleading,
too, as the apparent “returns” to, e.g., missing education were severely altered
due to the large increase in missing data.
Regarding the change in the between-plant wage variance (columns 3 and
4), wage structure effects associated with the constant, investment per worker,
the collective bargaining regime, the industry, and the level of education (see
above) contribute the most to declining wage dispersion in terms of the point
estimate, but, apart from education, none of them is statistically signiﬁcant.
Still, apart from investment, which had an inequality-dampening contribution
33 As Fitzenberger and Seidlitz (2020) note, there has also been a break in the part-time indicator as a
result of this reporting change. They argue that the incidence of part-time work was likely underestimated
before 2011. However, they also ﬁnd that this does not affect wage inequality trends among full-time work-
ers in West Germany until 2010. It might, however, affect the results for the change in wage inequality in
the more recent time period, to the extent that this break and the potential change in the sample composition
is not accounted for by our extensive set of control variables.
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TABLE 5
DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGES IN THE OVERALL, BETWEEN-PLANT, ANDWITHIN-PLANT VARIANCE, 2010–2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Variance
Between-Plant
Variance
Within-Plant
Variance
Total change 0.47 0.64 0.18
[0.48] [0.44] [0.13]
Composition
Wage
Structure Composition
Wage
Structure Composition
Wage
Structure
Nationality 0.07*** 0.14 0.08*** 0.11 0.00 0.10***
[0.03] [0.16] [0.02] [0.13] [0.00] [0.03]
Education 1.28*** 1.24*** 0.86*** 0.82** 0.13*** 0.08
[0.21] [0.39] [0.20] [0.34] [0.04] [0.12]
Age 0.12*** 0.84 0.08*** 0.16 0.06*** 0.04
[0.04] [0.60] [0.03] [0.52] [0.02] [0.16]
Tenure 0.27*** 0.51 0.23*** 1.12* 0.05 1.33***
[0.09] [0.80] [0.06] [0.65] [0.04] [0.25]
Occupation 0.15*** 0.25 0.08** 0.24 0.11*** 0.13
[0.05] [0.30] [0.04] [0.27] [0.02] [0.10]
Region 0.06 1.03 0.05 0.77 0.01 0.29
[0.06] [0.83] [0.06] [0.80] [0.01] [0.23]
Industry 0.18 0.11 0.24 0.87 0.04 0.80**
[0.18] [1.52] [0.20] [1.41] [0.03] [0.33]
Plant size 0.15 1.21 0.15 1.32 0.01 0.13
[0.15] [1.01] [0.15] [1.01] [0.03] [0.27]
Collective
bargaining
0.05 1.08 0.02 1.05 0.05*** 0.08
[0.05] [0.80] [0.05] [0.76] [0.02] [0.21]
Works council 0.28*** 1.19* 0.24*** 1.17* 0.02 0.00
[0.10] [0.66] [0.09] [0.67] [0.01] [0.20]
Export 0.05 0.72 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.55***
[0.04] [0.59] [0.04] [0.56] [0.01] [0.18]
Technology 0.11** 1.30* 0.07 1.17 0.01 0.07
[0.05] [0.77] [0.04] [0.78] [0.01] [0.23]
Investment per
worker
0.05 1.02 0.08 1.37 0.04* 0.49
[0.08] [2.87] [0.10] [1.16] [0.02] [0.33]
Constant 3.00 3.14 0.87
[4.43] [2.97] [0.80]
Total 2.20*** 2.24*** 1.47*** 1.68*** 0.32*** 0.12
[0.37] [0.49] [0.35] [0.46] [0.08] [0.12]
Reweighting error 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.05**
[0.11] [0.11] [0.02]
Speciﬁcation
error
0.07 0.09 0.02
[0.12] [0.11] [0.02]
Notes: The between-plant (within-plant) variance is constructed as the variance of predicted (residual) wages of a regression
of log individual wages on a full set of plant ﬁxed effects. The decomposition is based on LIAB data. The sample
includes full-time male workers between 18 and 65 years of age who work in West Germany. Sampling weights are
employed. All numbers are given in log percentage points. Bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications of the entire
procedure) account for clustering at the plant level and are shown in brackets. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.
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already in the earlier period, and the constant, all of the other mentioned fac-
tors were important for the increase in between-plant wage dispersion between
1996 and 2010. Thus, while some of the most important factors for between-
plant wage inequality remain the same, the sign of their contribution changed,
turning from inequality-increasing to inequality-dampening.
This is not true regarding the slight increase in within-plant wage dispersion
(columns 5 and 6). Here, the wage structure effects associated with the indus-
try and exporting are statistically signiﬁcant and quantitatively the most impor-
tant ones, which constitutes a change with respect to the earlier period. While
exporting did not play a role at all in the period 1996–2010, the industry wage
structure effect was negative. Because the wage structure effect of plant-level
variables captures differential changes in within-group wage dispersion relative
to the base category, this implies that, compared to the construction industry
(the base category), within-plant wage dispersion in the remaining industries
was rising by less in the earlier period, but by more in the years 2010–2014.
Wage inequality in East Germany. Our main analysis focused on West
Germany to allow for a better comparison of our results with seminal earlier
papers on the topic (Card, Heining, and Kline 2013; Dustmann, Ludsteck, and
Sch€onberg 2009). Furthermore, because the labor markets and wage schedules
in West and East Germany differ markedly—even today, but particularly in
the 1990s—pooling both regions would likely have contaminated the decom-
position results. In this subsection, we brieﬂy report on the decomposition
results for East Germany. We focus on our main period of analysis, 1996 to
2010. Results are displayed in Table 6.34
We focus on a few notable similarities and differences with respect to
West Germany. First of all, the increase in wage dispersion has been smal-
ler than in the West (5.2 as opposed to 8.7 log percentage points in terms
of the total variance, starting from a slightly higher initial level of inequal-
ity). Yet, the relative importance of the between-plant and the within-plant
component to the total increase has been similar, with the former’s contri-
bution amounting to 86 percent. Like in the West, the industry-related wage
structure effect contributes the most to total and between-plant wage disper-
sion (columns 2 and 4). In addition, shifts in the industry structure of
employment (i.e., the composition effect) also contributed toward higher
inequality (columns 1 and 3), which was not the case in the West. In
34 There is one difference in the speciﬁcation between East and West Germany. Because East German
workers are reliably recorded in the social security data only from 1992 onward, the tenure variable is left-
censored, and particularly severely so in 1996. We therefore only keep the tenure categories 0–2 years, 2–
4 years, >4 years, and missing tenure.
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TABLE 6
DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGES IN THE OVERALL, BETWEEN-PLANT, AND WITHIN-PLANT VARIANCE IN
EAST GERMANY, 1996–2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Variance
Between-Plant
Variance
Within-Plant
Variance
Total change 5.15*** 4.42*** 0.73***
[0.59] [0.57] [0.17]
Composition
Wage
Structure Composition
Wage
Structure Composition
Wage
Structure
Nationality 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.37 0.04 0.00
[0.10] [0.22] [0.08] (0.23] [0.03] [0.03]
Education 0.19 1.67*** 0.07 0.93*** 0.02 0.31**
[0.21] [0.37] [0.09] (0.31] [0.02] [0.15]
Age 0.43*** 0.33 0.10** 0.79 0.16*** 0.07
[0.07] [0.77] [0.05] (0.56] [0.03] [0.21]
Tenure 0.16* 2.24** 0.12 2.19** 0.00 0.08
[0.10] [1.14] [0.10] (0.98] [0.05] [0.41]
Occupation 0.11 0.39 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.28
[0.14] [0.36] [0.02] (0.30] [0.13] [0.17]
Region 0.01 0.96 0.00 0.87 0.01 0.24
[0.05] [1.51] [0.05] (1.43] [0.02] [0.36]
Industry 1.09*** 3.53*** 0.94** 3.79*** 0.21 0.54
[0.38] [1.04] [0.40] (1.01] [0.15] [0.42]
Plant size 0.11 1.37 0.15 1.56 0.09 0.09
[0.14] [1.17] [0.22] (1.24] [0.11] [0.43]
Collective
bargaining
0.41** 0.55 0.35** 0.69 0.08 0.20
[0.18] [0.62] [0.15] (0.60] [0.07] [0.22]
Works council 0.04 0.82 0.01 0.64 0.03 0.14
[0.07] [0.64] [0.04] (0.60] [0.04] [0.22]
Export 0.04 0.26 0.04 0.15 0.01 0.03
[0.17] [0.56] [0.16] (0.53] [0.06] [0.21]
Technology 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.04
[0.06] [0.63] [0.06] (0.63] [0.03] [0.23]
Investment per
worker
0.21* 1.31 0.32** 0.82 0.06 0.12
[0.13] [1.16] [0.14] (1.11] [0.06] [0.33]
Constant 1.02 0.46 1.05
[2.96] (2.92] [0.91]
Total 1.95*** 4.41*** 1.78*** 3.74*** 0.27 0.45*
[0.72] [0.68] [0.67] (0.64] [0.23] [0.24]
Reweighting error 0.67 0.61 0.00
[0.51] [0.45] [0.19]
Speciﬁcation error 0.54* 0.48* 0.00
[0.32] [0.29] [0.13]
Notes: The between-plant (within-plant) variance is constructed as the variance of predicted (residual) wages of a regression
of log individual wages on a full set of plant ﬁxed effects. The decomposition is based on LIAB data. The sample
includes full-time male workers between 18 and 65 years of age who work in East Germany. Sampling weights are
employed. All numbers are given in log percentage points. Bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications of the entire
procedure) account for clustering at the plant level and are shown in brackets. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.
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contrast, while (the decline in) collective bargaining does also matter in
terms of the composition effect, the bargaining-related wage structure effect
is not a factor behind the increase in wage dispersion in the East. As far
as other explanatory factors are concerned, changes in the education-related
wage structure are of similar quantitative importance as in the West, overall
(column 2). While they contribute slightly less to between-plant wage dis-
persion (column 4), they matter more for changes in within-plant wage dis-
persion (column 6) than in West Germany.
In sum, however, despite the aforementioned differences, the dynamics of
wage dispersion and its main sources have been remarkably similar in West
and East Germany.
Summary and Conclusion
Like many other countries, Germany experienced a strong increase in wage
dispersion in the last few decades before coming to a halt after 2010. Much of
this increase took place between plants as opposed to within plants, in line
with an increasing body of international evidence.
In this article, we have used rich linked employer–employee data to conduct
a detailed decomposition analysis based on RIF regressions. This allows us to
identify the sources of the increase in wage dispersion in Germany. In our
analysis, we have paid particular attention to the importance of many different
plant characteristics and to the divergent sources of between-plant and within-
plant wage dispersion, respectively.
Our main decomposition results point to shifts in the industry-related
wage structure, the decline in collective bargaining coverage, and changes
in the bargaining-related wage structure as main sources of the increase in
wage inequality. These factors affected primarily between-plant as opposed
to within-plant and lower-tail as opposed to upper-tail wage dispersion.
Among the individual-level variables, education matters the most, where
both employment shifts toward more highly skilled workers and, even more
so, changes in the skill-related wage structure have played important roles.
The education-related effect is quantitatively more important for between-
plant than for within-plant wage inequality, reﬂecting increased sorting of
workers along the skill dimension. In contrast, several other plant-level
characteristics, including plant size, the exporting status, plant technology,
and investment per worker are all of little if any quantitative importance
for the increase in wage dispersion.
It is important to note, however, that, while the decomposition analysis has
enabled us to identify the proximate sources of increased wage dispersion
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between and within plants, we are not able to attach to them a causal interpre-
tation in a deeper, structural sense. For example, changes in the industry-re-
lated and the bargaining-related wage structure did not come about
exogenously. It is perfectly conceivable that these have been caused by
changes in the competitive environment, potentially induced, e.g., by an accel-
erated globalization.35
Therefore, relating the proximate sources of rising wage inequality identiﬁed
in our analysis to deeper structural causes is a high priority for future research.
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